I Introduction
Imagine a casual discussion involving three Eurocrats in a café on the Brussels Grand Place. They are attending a meeting on the "Future of Pensions in the EU".
They are talking about the generosity of pensions. Each one contends that his own country is the most generous. The Belgian contends that his country is by far the most generous as it allows workers to retire as early as age 50 and that Belgium has the earliest effective age of retirement, i.e., 57 years for men. The Italian disagrees with this view: in his country the rate of replacement at age 65 is the highest, and that is the relevant measure of generosity. The third one, a Dutchman, completely disagrees with his two colleagues. "Generosity to whom?" he says: "In my country, pensions reduce the poverty rate among the elderly more than in any other country and that is what matters."
This imaginary discussion illustrates what this paper is all about. The concept of generosity is important, but at the same time very ambiguous. We distinguish among three types of generosity: one relying on average benefits, one focusing on early retirement, and finally one concerned with alleviating intragenerational inequality or poverty. A fourth definition would be one dealing with intergenerational redistribution, but it is outside of the scope of this paper.
Two questions are dealt with in the rest of this paper. First, what is the statistical correlation among our three concepts of generosity? Second, has this relation evolved over time, and to what extent is this evolution linked to economic openness? But before doing this i , we provide some theoretical predictions as to the relationships among these three types of generosity.
Political support of contributory systems
In order to talk about the relation between average and redistributive generosity we have to introduce a traditional distinction between two extreme types of pension systems. The first one provides earnings-related benefits; it is also labeled Bismarckian, or contributive. At the other extreme, one finds pension systems whose benefit structure is such that the replacement rate (benefit to earning ratio) declines as earnings increase. out of poverty, then a contributory system can end up being very costly, having not much incidence on income redistribution while being efficient at alleviating poverty.
Unavoidable distortions
As shown by Gruber and Wise (1999) one of the main factors of early retirement is the implicit tax on prolonged activity, which in some countries is pretty high. Implicit taxation can be explained by the concern of governments with regard to the unemployment of young people. But even without such a concern, no government that tries to achieve some redistribution can avoid tax distortions. In a first best world it might be possible to redistribute income in a non distortionary way, in other words, in maintaining an equality between the marginal disutility of one more year of work and its marginal productivity. In the second best world non distortionary taxes are not available. Hence any redistribution entails taxes and pension benefits that induce workers to retire earlier than they would in a market economy, or in a first-best setting.
iv Such an observation would imply some positive correlation between early retirement generosity and redistributive generosity.
However it can be shown that when the implicit taxes are really too distortionary, reducing them could have a double dividend: an improvement of income inequality among retirees and an increase in revenue. v To conclude, the question of whether or not early retirement and either redistribution or poverty alleviation are positively correlated, can only be answered empirically.
Race to the bottom
One of the main alleged pitfalls of the ongoing economic integration is that it would impede redistributive policies at the national level, plus threaten the future of the welfare state. The basic idea is that mobile factors of production, labor or capital, can adjust their location to any international differentials in taxation or benefits. Hence national governments cannot abstract from such potential reactions when designing redistributive policies. To illustrate this point, assume a small open economy that provides retirees with a minimum pension benefit regardless of the value of their contributions. Assume also that workers can move freely across countries. It is likely that low-income workers will move in and that high-income workers will move out to other countries that have a contributory system. This would lead our small open economy to an unsustainable outcome, as it would be forced to adopt a less redistributive system. This is what is called "the race to the bottom", a notion that does not seem as radical as one could have feared a few decades ago. vi
The data
We use two types of data for the average generosity of the pension system.
AVGEN1 is simply the share of public pension spending in GDP, and AVGEN2 is the rate of replacement at 65. This rate of replacement that comes from OECD is compiled for 6 typical households distinguished by earnings and marital status. Both are presented on Table 1 for the year 1995. Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients vii between these two indicators. The most and least generous countries according to AVGEN1, are Italy and Australia respectively. According to AVGEN2, the more generous is again Italy and the least is now Norway. These two concepts are not perfectly correlated, as AVGEN2 comes from the rate of replacement of only those retirees who are covered whereas AVGEN1 includes the rate of replacement, but also the rate of coverage that varies across countries.
For the generosity towards early retirement we also use two indicators:
ERGEN1 is the effective age of retirement of male workers and ERGEN2 is the ratio of replacement at 55. As one can note, it is equal to 0 in some countries which don't have any such schemes. ERGEN1 ranges from 66.5 in Japan to 58.8 in the Netherlands and ERGEN2 ranges from 0.7 in Italy to 0 in the US, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and Australia. One observes some intersection between ERGEN1 and ERGEN2:
countries characterized by generous rates of replacement for early retirees also count more early retirees than the others (implicit tax rates on prolonged activity are linked to these replacement rates).
Finally we have two indicators of redistributive generosity. The first one concerns poverty alleviation (the difference between poverty without and with net public transfers). It is denoted POVGEN, and ranges from 78% in France to 25% in Japan.
The second redistributive indicator consists of the ratio of the income share of public pensions in the first quintile to the same share in the top quintile. It is called INEGEN and ranges from 8.9 in Australia to 1 in France. One could expect these two indicators to be positively related. This is not the case as it appears on Table 2 . Although surprising at first sight this is perfectly understandable. Poverty is just one aspect of inequality. A pension system can be distributively neutral on most of the income scale and at the same time provide the poor retirees with a good minimum pension. Also it can reduce inequality without alleviating poverty. Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for all these indicators. We have already discussed the correlations between indicators measuring the same type of generosity. We now turn to the relations for which we have some theoretical predictions.
Correlations
Redistribution and average generosity: It appears that using both AVGEN1
and AVGEN2 and either correlation coefficient there is a negative relation between redistribution and average generosity. This seems to vindicate the political economy theory which says that the more contributory a pension scheme, the more generous it will be in average terms. Does that mean that average generosity is good for the poor?
In fact, it appears that rich programs are in this instance good for the poor.
Poverty alleviation and average generosity: Indeed there is a positive though hardly significant relation between poverty alleviation and average generosity: this implies that schemes that are generous on average include programs that alleviate poverty.
Early retirement and redistribution:
It is interesting to note a high correlation between ERGEN2 based on the replacement ratio offered to early retirees and either measure of average generosity. That indicates that there is no trade-off between early retirement and normal retirement. Instead, if we use the other indicator, ERGEN1, the coefficient is negative, but hardly significant. This implies that countries with generous but restricted early retirement, are also those that have a generous pension system on average.
Concerning the link between redistributive generosity and early retirement, we have a negative, but not significant correlation between INEGEN and ERGEN2, which does not vindicate the idea of a double dividend. 
IV Changes over time
The previous section was based on data concerning 14 countries and the year 1995.
We also have data for 1985 and 2000 (see the appendix). This allows us to first check if the coefficients of correlation just discussed are changing over time. Then we look at the question of social dumping, given that the period 1985-2000 is one of increased economic integration.
Stability of correlations
On the basis of the previous section we are going to focus on three relations, the one between AVGEN1 and INEGEN, the one between AVGEN1 and POVGEN and the one between AVGEN2 and ERGEN2 to see how they evolve over time, namely over the period 1985-2000. This is presented on Table 3 . It appears that there has been little change in these correlations among these types of generosity. Table 4 gives the variations in the generosity indicators between the years 1985 and 1995 along with an indicator of economic openness viii (TOI) that will be used to test the existence of a race-to-the-bottom.
Three evolutions are worth noting. First DPOVGEN, the variation in the extent of poverty alleviation due to social security is positive in 8 countries and negative in 6.
In other words one cannot see any trend towards less poverty alleviation. Second there is DINEGEN, which is negative in 10 out of 14 countries. Here we can say that there is a trend towards less reduction in inequality or alternatively towards more contributiveness. Finally there is DERGEN1, the change in the effective age of retirement. Very interestingly, DERGEN1 is negative everywhere. It thus seems that for reasons of globalization or ageing, all concerned countries are under pressure to reduce the generosity of their social security systems towards early retirement.
Appendix Table A5 gives the changes in generosity for the period 1995-2000. We observe more or less the same pattern. 
V Conclusion
The main idea of this paper is that a social security system -including not only old age pension systems but also disability and unemployment insurance, early retirement scheme and welfare programs -can be labeled generous in a number of different ways. First it can be generous towards early retirement by offering workers aged 55-65 relatively high benefits. Second, it can be generous towards people who retire at the normal age (generally 65). Third it can be generous towards the poor retirees by giving them benefits well above their contributions.
To conclude, we have provided evidence for these three definitions of generosity, and shown that they are not closely correlated. The main result is that Bismarckian contributory programs tend to offer generous pensions that in turn benefit the poor. This is a vindication of the idea that programs for the poor are poor programs, and that rich programs are good for the poor. We also note the link between economic integration and redistribution. All in all variation in poverty alleviation is related to the openness of the economies concerned. OECD (2004 OECD ( , 2003 , Förster (2003) , Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) . 0.769*** 0.633** 0.584** *** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% OECD(2004 OECD( , 2003 , Förster(2003) , Blondal and Scarpetta (1999) OECD(2004 OECD( , 2003 , Förster(2003) , Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte (2004) This paper is an extension of Pestieau (2006) .
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iii Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2003) .
iv Cremer et al. (2004) . ix We tried some other specifications like pooling the data from 1995 and 2000 or adding others explicative variables (dependancy ratio and social spending) and it did not change the sign and the significance of the results. We prefer keeping this specification because of graphical representation.
